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ABSTRACT 
Corruption in the forest sector of Swat, Pakistan is impairing the sustainable 
management of forest. We analyze corruption in a case study setting against 
the  backdrop  of  the  reform  options  that  are  most  often  cited  as  possible 
solutions. As we highlight in this study, the ‘crime and punishment’ approach 
is not feasibly implemented if the overall institutional environment is weak. 
Since  countrywide  overhaul  of  corruption  through  sweeping  reform 
programs, the other reform approach, is a difficult and lengthy task, there is a 
need for an alternative kind of reform. In the case of a corruption-ridden 
centralised  forest  management  regime,  institutional  reform  should  move 
away  from  enforcement  of  existing  institutions  and  promote  communal 
management of natural resources by locals.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Developing countries are often characterized by long-standing and severe environmental 
problems,  and  lack  institutional  strength  to  tackle  them  effectively.  Deforestation  in 
Pakistan is one case in point. The control of logging is fraught with difficulties since 
formal institutions have little influence on the behaviour of individuals and organizations. 
In this article, we analyse, in a case study setting, how corruption affects the management 
of forests in Swat, Pakistan. While examining the factors that are conducive to corruption, 
we will also highlight the difficulties of applying the standard policy prescriptions for  
 
dealing with corruption. Finally, we outline how strategies based on institutional change 
at the local level can help improving the management regime and controlling corruption. 
Pakistani state and society face challenges associated with the history of the country: 
political instability, secessionist movements, lack of rule of the law, and shortage of basic 
public  services,  just  to mention  a  few.  Deforestation  is  one  of  these  challenges  with 
worrisome environmental, social, and economic consequences. Environmental services 
provided  by  the  forest  include  biodiversity,  watershed  protection,  microclimate 
regulation, amenity and services at the global level (Asian Development Bank, 2000; 
Brown  and  Durst,  2003).  Furthermore,  the  services  provided  by  the  forest  are  also 
important for agricultural activities where the forests, apart from their role in keeping 
watersheds, also prevent local climate change that can damage crops. The importance of 
forests for the country was recognised when the extensive floods of 1992 were imputed to 
deforestation and a commercial timber extraction ban was enacted in the same year (Rao 
and  Marwat,  2003).  From  the  social  point  of  view,  another  reason  for  interest  in 
deforestation is that poor communities extract a substantial share of their revenues from 
the forest (Rafi Khan et al., 2006). The administrative resources available to the forest 
sector are contended over the pressing needs mentioned above. 
In virtually all countries, formal rules have been adopted in order to prevent depletion 
of renewable natural resources. Where –like in Pakistan– deforestation is taking place, 
institutional failure is self-evident: the de facto management of the forest contradicts the 
de jure setting. In this case study we analyze the causes of institutional failure in the 
protection of forests in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan, namely in 
the Swat district. Statutory law rigorously constrains exploitation activities and the forest 
department is in charge of enforcement, but idiosyncrasies between formal provisions and 
actual institutions create open access of forests by loggers. 
During  the  study  corruption  emerged  as  a  fundamental  contributor  to  the  current 
pattern of forest exploitation. Corruption is crucial in the deforestation process: at every 
step of illegal logging bribes are disbursed, during the extraction of logs, their transport 
and  their  marketing.  As  we  will  highlight  in  this  study,  the  ‘crime  and  punishment’ 
approach (Becker, 1968), which prescribes increase of monitoring activities and harsher 
punishments in order to decrease corruption, is not easily implemented if the overall 
institutional environment is not supportive. Countrywide overhaul of corruption, based on 
sweeping  reforms,  is  a  difficult  and  lengthy  task,  which  is  seldom  accomplished 
(Kaufmann et al., 2005). Analysing corruption in a case study setting induces to look for 
institutional  reforms  that  are  limited  to a  specific  sector and  that  do  not  require  far-
reaching institutional change. Even though corruption is often cited in reports and articles 
about illegal logging, we find that there is a lack of case studies on corruption that put it  
 
in the institutional context and use an economic framework for suggesting reform.
2 In our 
study, corruption will be analysed in a new institutional economics framework, where the 
focus will be on transaction costs and enforcement costs of property rights. 
Corruption is endemic to many developing countries but Pakistan always features in 
the highest positions in the rankings that are produced by international organizations (e.g. 
Kaufmann  et  al.,  2005;  Transparency  International,  2004).  In  Pakistani  society  the 
phenomenon of corruption is particularly pervasive and affects also the operations of law 
and enforcement agencies (police and the judiciary) (Transparency International, 2002). 
Surveys,  realized  by  international  organizations  with  the  intent  of  comparison  across 
countries,  indicate  that  members  of  law  enforcement  agencies  are  among  the  main 
offenders in corruption cases. The ‘abuse of power in order to serve private interest’, the 
common  definition  of  corruption  (e.g.  Lambsdorff,  2004),  is  widespread  also  in  the 
forestry sector of Pakistan. The difficulty of monitoring civil servants operating in remote 
areas, and the general corruptibility of Pakistani public administration contribute to the 
prevalence of corruption in the forest sector. Also during our study, through interviews 
with  informed  agents,  we  collected  witness  evidence  about  employees  of  the  forest 
department and of the forest development corporation (that is, the agencies in charge of 
enforcement in the forest sector) being involved in corruption in the forestry sector (see 
also Rafi Khan et al., 2006).  
Due to the fact that environmental problems require active public policies to be eased, 
it is not a surprise to find that countries that are in institutional disarray are not successful 
in dealing with environmental issues. Many of the benefits produced by the forest are 
public goods whose production requires successful coordination of the efforts of several 
individuals  (Ostrom  and  Gardner,  1993).  Nevertheless,  institutional  failures  at  the 
national level do not always lead to environmental disruption and unsustainable resource 
use.  For  example,  Ostrom  (1990)  reports  a  list  of  cases  where  natural  resources  are 
managed sustainably, as commons, by local communities. Many of these success stories 
are  from  developing  countries  characterized  by  countrywide  institutional  disarray.  It 
appears then that institutions managing specific natural resource, when members of local 
communities  coordinate  effectively,  can  be  successful  even  when  the  national 
institutional  setting  is  problematic.  These  findings  entail  that  local  institutional 
                                                 
2 Existing studies serve, for example, the purpose of highlighting cases of officials and individuals 
involved in illegal logging in order to push authorities to intervene (e.g. Environmental Investigation 
Agency and Telapak, 2001). The lack of case studies can be caused by  the difficulties of  getting 
information on illegal operations. Already Myrdal (1968) mentioned that corruption is ``almost taboo 
as a research topic [...], revealing a general bias that we have characterised as diplomacy in research”. 
Even  though  research  on  corruption  has  largely  expanded  in  recent  years,  case  studies  involving 
fieldwork can still be affected by diplomacy in research; for instance, Perry (1997) still finds corruption 
to be taboo in geography.  
 
frameworks could achieve sustainable development even though the country as a whole is 
characterised by institutional shortfalls. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents a literature review of studies of 
corruption  and  environmental  policies,  analysis  levels  of  corruption  in  Pakistan  and 
highlights  the  conditions  for  successful  communal  management;  and  introduces  the 
theoretical framework; Section 3 describes geography and institutions in the case study 
area; Section 4 describes the dynamics producing deforestation; Section 5 summarises the 
ongoing  reform  process,  underlines  its  shortfalls  and  possible  improvements  of  the 
process. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.  INSTITUTIONS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
In this section we review the literature on corruption and the environment, discuss the 
incidence  of  corruption  in  Pakistan,  we  highlight  the  theoretical  underpinning  of  the 
study,  and  outline  the  conditions  that  enhance  communal  management  of  natural 
resources.  
 
2.1 Corruption and the environment 
Environmental degradation requires mechanisms of social coordination to be corrected, 
but successful involvement of the government is difficult to obtain. Those who have 
vested interests in the current state of affairs will use their power to arrest institutional 
change (grand corruption) and enforcement at the lower level by civil servants will be 
ineffective (petty corruption). In this section, we briefly summarize existing evidence of 
the role that corruption has on the environment; in the next section we outline corruption 
incidence in the agencies most directly involved in the implementation and enforcement 
of forestry policies in Pakistan: the police, the judiciary, and the forest department. 
Even though evidence over the spread of corruption is difficult to obtain because of 
the secrecy surrounding corruption deals, some empirical studies have been produced 
over the effect of corruption on environmental policies’ formulation and implementation. 
Furthermore,  a  large  number  of  case  studies  and  reports  confirm  how  corruption 
compromises the implementation of environmental regulations.  
In  a  cross-country  empirical  analysis,  Pellegrini  and  Gerlagh  (2006)  using  two 
indicators of environmental policy stringency and numerous control variables, find that 
corruption is one of the main determinants of the level of environmental protection across 
countries. Theoretical papers on corruption and environmental policy include Lopez and 
Mitra,  2000  and  Damania,  2002.  Studies  focusing  on  corruption  in  the  forest  sector 
include The World Bank’s (Callister, 1999) report on corruption and forestry, reports on  
 
illegal  logging  in  Indonesia  (Environmental  Investigation  Agency  and  Telapak,  2001; 
2003) and Robbins (2000) that uses a theoretical framework for the analysis of corruption 
and then applies it to a natural reserve in Rajastan, India Finally, Rosenbaum (2005), after 
maintaining that corruption promotes illegal logging and trade, presents a list of lessons 
for reforming the sector which are drawn from Transparency International’s toolbox for 
fighting corruption. Transparency International promotes national integrity systems that 
are a series of interventions at the national level for decreasing corruption. Rosenbaum 
borrows some tools from the national integrity system for the forest sector in order to 
create  a  list  of  interventions  for  reducing  corruption  in  the  forest  sector.  These 
interventions  include  creating  a  knowledge  center,  creating  a  forest  sector  corruption 
index, promoting awareness campaigns, encouraging forest certification, etc. 
 
2.2 Evidence on the extent of corruption in Pakistan  
The  public  administration  of  Pakistan  is  plagued  by  corruption.  Even  though  hard 
evidence  of  corruption’s  incidence  is  difficult  to  obtain,  surveys,  news  reports,  case 
studies, historical accounts, and information collected during our study all indicate that 
corruption is pervasive at all levels. Islam, in his study of the Pakistani public service 
states,  “Corruption  in  Pakistan  is  a  way  of  life”  (2004:  314).  It  is  the  National 
Accountability Bureau, a governmental agency in charge of drafting the National Anti-
Corruption Strategy, that states: “Corruption has become a disease infecting every aspect 
of political, social and economic activity” (Hafiez, 2002: 1). In order to be able to better 
place the forest sector in its institutional environment, in this sub-section, we will focus 
on  the  evidence  of  corruption  in  the  agencies  most  directly  involved  in  the 
implementation  and  enforcement  of  forest  policy  and  regulations:  the  judiciary,  the 
police, and the forest department. 
The  extent  of  corruption  in  Pakistani’s  enforcement  agencies  is  evident  from  the 
results of an extensive household survey conduced by Transparency International (2002). 
During the survey 3000 households from urban and semi-urban areas of Pakistan have 
been interviewed. A high share of respondents declared that at least one member of the 
household had to deal with the police, or the judiciary in the previous year (32%, and 6%, 
respectively). Most strikingly, all of those interviewed who had had contact with the 
police  reported  corruption  (that  is  960  respondents  out  of  the  total  sample  of  3000). 
According to the survey results, corruption – while dealing with the police – took several 
forms, including outright extortion perpetrated by police officers and payments required 
to be released from arbitrary imprisonment. Among those who dealt with the judiciary, 
96% reported corruption. In most cases court employees and judges demanded bribes, but  
 
corruption in the law sector is so widespread that it was not uncommon to bribe also the 
opponent’s lawyer and the public persecutor.  
Corruption’s incidence, in the police department and in the judiciary, is all the more 
important  to  understand  the  effect  of  corruption  on  forest  management.  In  fact,  the 
success of enforcement tasks delegated to the forest department, in cases where there is 
violence or complaints are taken to the courts, depends also on the collaboration of these 
enforcement agencies.  
As for the forest department itself, anecdotal evidence of corruption abounds. During 
the fieldwork several interviews (with members of the local communities, with NGOs, 
but  also  with  members  of  the  forest  department)  provided  evidence  of  corruption. 
Steimann (2004), in his detailed analysis of the structure of the forest department, finds 
that forest guards levy fines in a entirely arbitrary fashion, and in most case they result in 
a bribe. It appears that the lower ranks of the forest department are completely oblivious 
of the Forest Ordinance (that should regulate many of their responsibilities, including 
fining) and they are not aware of the formal regime of fines (let alone being willing or 
able to properly enforce them).  
The incentive structure faced by the employees of the forest department determines 
their likelihood to collude. We must mention, among the factors that determine forest 
guards’ behaviour, that wages of the lower rank employees of the forest department are 
around or below the survival line for those who have to support a large family. Under 
these economic circumstances, turning a blind eye on illegal logging and collecting bribes 
looks  like  a  necessary  addition  to  a  meagre  salary  (for  a  study  of  wages  levels  and 
corruption  see  Van  Rijckeghem  and  Weder,  2001).
3  Another  factor  influencing  the 
behaviour of enforcement agents is that conflicts in the area turn easily to violence and 
these  conflicts  have  involved  forest  guards  in  the  past.  Duty-related  incidents  have 
resulted  in  serious  injuries  and,  in  a  few  cases,  also  in  the  death  of  forest  officials 
(Steimann, 2004). Conflict makes the cooperation of the police and the judiciary even 
more  essential,  because  the  lack  of  cooperation  weakens  the  position  of  the  forest 
department  in  relation  to  timber  smugglers.  The  fact  that,  as  mentioned  above, 
cooperation from other enforcement agencies is absent contributes to the prevalence of 
corruption in the forest department.
4 
 
                                                 
3 Forest guards need wood for heating purposes, but they are not given allowances to purchase it 
legally. This makes them dependent on, at least part of, the wood that is being logged illegally.  
4 Reportedly the forest department has been asked in several occasions to allow smuggling of timber 
directed to judges and prosecutors in order to obtain cooperation by the judiciary.  
 
2.3 Methodological framework 
The theoretical framework utilized in this study of corruption and forest management is 
based on the new institutional economics approach. We will look at the way institutions 
constrain choices of economic agents (North, 1990). In the context of formal institutions, 
corruption represents a weakening of constraints: disbursing bribes facilitates operations 
that  are  inconsistent  with  legal  institutions.  Institutions,  apart  from  constraining 
behaviour,  define  also  opportunities.  In  some  circumstances,  however,  to  exploit  the 
prospects offered by the legal system bribes need to be paid (e.g. when locals have to pay 
inducements in order to extract logs for self-consumption). In order to understand the 
failure of formal institutions to influence economic agents’ behaviour, we will focus on 
transaction costs and more specifically on enforcement costs of property rights.
5, 6 
A relevant category of costs is transaction costs: the costs that occur when a bundle of 
rights (related to a good or service) is transferred across economic agents (Coase, 1960). 
One stage of activity ends and another begins (Williamson, 1985). When, as in Swat, de 
facto property regimes do not coincide with legal provisions, also illegal costs – such as 
bribing – are part of the costs of the transaction. Enforcement costs are a sub-category of 
transaction costs and pertain to the expenses occurred in order to put into effect property 
rights.  
Enforcement costs of de jure institutional settings are a key for understanding the 
evolution of natural resources management and its likelihood to fail. In the case of the 
forest, the enforcement of property rights entails guarding it and monitoring extractive 
activities. The legislator in Pakistan opted for a forest management regime characterised 
by pervasive control by state agents. The state and its agencies should effectively monitor 
all forestry operations. Enforcement costs of the regime are prohibitive and the system 
has proven unattainable. 
Different property regimes entail different rights (and duties) for economic agents and 
have implications for the management of the resource.
7 The formal property regime of 
most of the forest in Swat is state property, with some rights given to local communities 
and former owners and the enforcement is based on state agencies (primarily the forest 
department).  
In the rest of the article we assess the working of existent management regime to 
diagnose the reasons of the failures. However, focusing only on the failures of the current 
                                                 
5 For a detailed account of the theoretical framework adopted during the research see Pellegrini and 
Kruseman, 2005.  
6 Transaction costs can be imputed in a variety of ways to different agents. Bromley (1989) has shown 
that the distribution of transaction costs influences distributional and environmental outcomes.  
7  For  a  comprehensive  overview  of  bundles  of  rights  associated  with  property  right  regimes  see 
Schlager and Ostrom, 1992.  
 
regime would not be very useful. Hence, in this section we also summarize theoretical 
and empirical underpinnings of an alternative management system that we suggest to 
explore: common property management. 
While reviewing the findings of studies completed over the last few decades, Ostrom 
(2000) summarizes the conditions that increase the probability of successful communal 
management. These conditions relate both to characteristics of the resource and of the 
appropriators. With respect to the resource, the likelihood of successful management as a 
common is enhanced if improvement is feasible, reliable indicators of the condition of the 
resource are available, the flow of resources is predictable, and forest boundaries are 
clear. Parts of the forest of Swat are so degraded that improvements to its stock are 
feasible only over a medium to long period of time, but most of the other conditions are 
met: the state of the forest is directly observable, the regenerative potential is predictable 
and communities’ boundaries are mostly undisputed. With respect to the appropriators, 
the conditions are: resource saliency for the users, common understanding, low discount 
rate  for  the  agents,  trust  and  reciprocity  in  the  community,  autonomy  (e.g.  the 
appropriators are able to rule themselves), and prior organizational experience. These 
conditions are the ones that are the most difficult to meet in Swat. Adherence to these 
conditions is heterogeneous: some communities meet most of the conditions, while others 
are more deficient. Generally, saliency and shared understanding are the conditions that 
will be met more easily: income in rural communities is very low and resources extracted 
from the forest make up a large share of income (Rafi Khan et al., 2006), the forest 
standing  has  a  predictable  evolution  and  communities’  members  are  aware  of  its 
functioning. Discount rates are not particularly low because incomes are meagre and there 
is migration. Trust and reciprocity and previous organizational experience are contingent 
on each community, on its social cohesion and its history. Autonomy is absent in the 
present  situation,  but  that  is  the  condition  to  achieve  in  case  of  institutional  change 
towards communal management. 
Overall,  the  conditions  mentioned  above  affect  the  individual  agents’  cost  benefit 
calculations of engaging in communal management (Ostrom, 2000). Policy interventions 
that  promote  communal  management  should  include  instruments  to  promote  these 
conditions in order to enhance the likelihood of success. It is worth reminding the reader 
that these conditions are not a list of necessary and sufficient conditions. There is also an 
important role for individuals in the setting up of commons’ management mechanisms. 
The uncoordinated activities of individual members of local communities are partially 
unpredictable  and  make  it  impossible  to  be  entirely  certain  of  the  outcome  of  their 
interaction.  Furthermore,  once  we  consider  self-organization  in  a  longer  temporal 
framework, it is important to emphasize that social systems are dynamic and evolve over 
time, therefore though the local community is not self organizing at one point in time it  
 
can develop in that direction at a later stage. Learning can make a community able to 
copy other communities’ solutions, or to adapt them to their own socio-environmental 
conditions. Summing up, the list of conditions mentioned above can be considered as a 
benchmark for estimating the likelihood to achieve successful coordination in a common 
over  the  short  period,  or  objectives  to  be  achieved  as  an  intermediate  step  toward 
effective communal management. 
Finally,  as  mentioned  above,  the  transition  to  communal management  can  also  be 
problematic and give way to a situation where the poorest members of the community 
continue  being  marginalized.  It  is  important  to  note  that  local  communities  are  not 
homogeneous. Individuals, within the community, can try to extract as much resources as 
possible, depending on their power (Garcia-Frapolli, 2004) and initiatives encouraging 
self-organization  can  easily  be  hijacked  by  commanding  agents  (Rola  and  Coxhead, 
2005). Hence, the end results of policies promoting communal management should be 
carefully monitored (especially at the implementation stage) and they cannot be assumed 
a success. 
 
3.  A PROFILE OF SWAT, PAKISTAN 
For the understanding of dynamics of deforestation in Swat, it is important to describe the 
physical  and  human  geography  of  the  study  area,  and  the  institutional  settings 
characterizing it.  
3.1 Geography and ecology 
Pakistani forest endowment is dwindling. In the decade 1990-2000, the deforestation rate 
for the whole country was 1.5% per year (Brown and Durst, 2003). Once we consider that 
only a minute part of Pakistan is forested (around 3% of the total area), the trend is even 
more compelling. The North West Frontier Province (one of four that compose Pakistan) 
contains the largest amount of forest (around 40% of the total, Government of Pakistan, 
1992). Our case study focused on an area that traditionally was mostly covered by forest 
and still contains significant tracts of forest, but is also marked by deforestation: the Swat 
district.
8  
The Swat valley is named after the river that runs through it and it includes several sub 
valleys. At the lower end of the valley, there is the district capital, Mingora, which is also 
                                                 
8 The North West Frontier Province has a set up that was instituted during the British colonial rule. The 
Province is divided in divisions, themselves divided into districts. The Malakand division contains the 
Malakand, Swat, Dir, and Citral districts. Apart from the districts, The North West Frontier Province 
also contains Federally Administered Tribal Areas, where federal and provincial government have very 
limited powers (mostly limited to military incursions related to terrorism and drug activities).  
 
the most important urban agglomerate. From there, moving northwards along the valley, 
lower plains with agriculture and fruit orchards are the dominant land use. Moving higher 
up  in  the  valley,  with  the  increasing  altitude,  forests,  alpine  pastures,  and  perennial 
glaciers take the place of agricultural activities. The settlements decrease in size going up 
the  valley.  Transport  infrastructures  become  scarcer  and  most  of  the  transport  to  the 
villages nearest to the glaciers is on foot.  
The forest standing in this district is of special interest because it is one of the most 
dense of Pakistan, because of the ecological diversity within its boundaries, because the 
area is very poor and the poor are dependent on resources and income coming from the 
forest,  and  because  the  watershed  is  large  and  influences  the  water  basin  of  various 
hydropower stations. 
3.2 History and institutions 
History is at the root of the status quo and it shapes expectations (claims and rights). The 
history of Swat has a bearing on current land tenure and forest management, because 
historical  developments  are  at  the  origin  of  the  right  holding  of  heirs  of  the  most 
important families allied to the local dictator. In this section we will outline the historical 
evolution leading to the modern management regime.  
Swat  has  a  distinct  history  in  relation to  Pakistan  and  the  rest  of  the  Indian  sub-
continent. While the rest of the area was colonised by the British crown, Swat succeeded 
in conserving its autonomy and, once Pakistan became independent in 1947, it did not 
fully accede to Pakistan until 1969.
9  
 
3.2.1   Pre accession 
The  earlier  history  of  Swat  (from  the  end  of  the  19
th  century)  was  marked  by  the 
emergence of a political structure characterised by the extensive powers of the autocrat. 
The dictator, called Wali, was leading a rebellious country and needed the support of 
allies from the powerful families of Swat in order to defend the Princely State of Swat (as 
the state was officially called before the accession to Pakistan). Challenges to the state 
came  from external  powers  (the  British  and  the neighbouring  Kalam  state)  and  from 
internal  ones (other  local  leaders trying  to  seize power)  (Sultan-i-Rome, 2005).  As  a 
result, the rulers were under continuous threat and they were used to build alliances with 
wealthy local lords. 
The  history  of  the  Wali is  especially  important  for  the management  of  the  forest, 
because natural resources were valuable assets used for building and keeping alliances, 
                                                 
9 For an account of Swat’s resistance to outsiders occupation and interference see Lindholm, 1990.  
 
thus their exploitation was crucial to the survival of the regime. The management system 
compounded harsh punishments to those who illegally encroached on the forest, while 
allowing  favouritism  and  smuggling  when  such  was  in  the  Wali’s  –  or  his  allies’  – 
benefit.  The  decision  power,  with  respect  to  logging  and  forest  exploitation,  was 
centralised and rested in the hands of the Wali.
 10 
 
3.2.2   Post accession 
The accession to Pakistan of the Princely State of Swat swiftly changed the institutional 
setting. The national state took under its control the management and exploitation of 
forests. The law provided only for a minute disbursement of royalties (10% of the total 
net revenues) to be paid to the legal right holders and established some extraction rights 
for local communities to meet consumption needs of the residents.  
Pakistani state’s forest management was, from the very beginning, characterized by a 
command and control approach but the effective enforcement was beyond the state’s 
capability.
11 The post-accession regime implied that most of the forests were declared 
reserved  or  protected,  i.e.  the  management  regimes  strictly  constrained  exploitation 
rights.
12 Ownership and management rested in the hands of the state, through the forest 
department.  In  the  reserve  forest,  no  cutting  is  allowed  and  members  of  the  local 
community have limited rights for extracting dry wood and non-timber forest products. In 
protected forest, the forest department is in charge of the management plan and at times 
when there are cuttings, the forest development corporation is in charge of the cutting of 
marked timber, but shares of the net sales revenues are given to right holders (Steimann, 
2004). Moreover, a “local quota” of timber is reserved to local residents for their needs 
and there is an “emergency quota” that can be used under special circumstances, e.g. to 
rebuild a house after a fire.
 13  
The shares of revenues from wood sales directed to right holders have been increasing 
over time, from 10% at the time of accession, to 60% nowadays. Those entitled to shares 
                                                 
10 For a detailed historical account of the autocratic rule of the Wali of Swat, the strictness of the 
application of the law to the commoners, the importance that forestry had under his rule, and the illegal 
cutting and favours for his allies (the Khans) see Sultan-i-Rome, 2005. For an altogether different 
version of the Wali’s rule see his autobiography (Barth, 1985). 
11 Pakistan was not the only state that tried to control the forest sector without the necessary resources 
to implement its own rules on the face of high transaction costs. For comparison see Ostrom (1990) on 
Nepal. 
12 A third category of forests are the guzara forests. They are those whose property was left to the 
communities,  even  though  relevant  management  responsibilities  were  taken  over  by  the  forest 
department. Guzara forest is an institutional setup that characterized almost no forest in our study area. 
13 For a detailed description of legal status and management provisions in the forest of the whole of the 
North West Frontier Province see Steimann, 2004.  
 
of the royalties of the forest are the land owners (mostly Khans families – the former 
allies of the Wali) that reside far away from the forest, or local communities, depending 
on the property situation of the forest at the time it was taken over by the state.
14  
The state has been incapable to implement the management regime outlined above, 
and together with the dismantlement of the previous regime of property rights, this has 
led  to  an  open  access  regime.
15  Additionally,  the  gap  between  de  jure  and  de  facto 
management of the forest created multiple bases for claiming rights on the forest: the 
statutory law, custom, and the de facto regime.
16 Agents can then refer to competing 
bases to justify their claims according to their interests (i.e. there is forum shopping) 
(Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 2002).  
The  open  access  regime on  the  forest  implies  that  landowners  and  local  residents 
exploiting the forest are only restrained by local power relations. An unabridged gap 
persists  between  the  regulatory  framework  and  the  actual  management  practices. 
Encroachments  and  illegal  cuttings  continue.  Furthermore,  legal  disputes  over  the 
cuttings’ royalties abound and court decisions settling them are delayed (at times for 
decades), and, in many cases, court decisions are still pending. 
The operations of the forest department have not become more functional to date.
17 
Corruption is widespread and it affects all the operations of the forest department. Forest 
guards are paid salaries that cannot satisfy the needs of families (Steimann, 2004) and 
they are lacking the support of the other enforcement agencies (which, as we saw above, 
are themselves inefficient and plagued by corruption). The overall enforcement system 
seems more geared to make ends meet for forest officials, than to protect the forest. There 
are numerous check-posts along the roads going down the Swat Valley, but these serve 




                                                 
14 Property rights over the forest are contested and contention over property rights is a source of endless 
litigations that are dealt by Pakistan’s corrupt and inefficient judiciary system.  
15 Dismantling existing institutions for the management of natural resources without succeeding in 
creating new ones has been a common procedure in many developed and developing countries over the 
last few decades.  
16 Customs and de facto regimes can differ because the former borrows legitimacy from the tradition, 
while the former is simply the current state of affairs.   
17  We  collected  information  through  focus  group  discussions  and  interviews  during  the  fieldwork. 
Different sources, including employees of the forest department itself, confirmed the dismal state of the 
forest department operations. 
18 This was confirmed by numerous interviews and by our own witnessing the ease of movement of 
truckloads of illegal logs in thorough the valley.  
 
4.  4 DEFORESTATION IN SWAT, PAKISTAN 
Deforestation in Swat is taking place because of institutional failure. Formal rules, if 
applied, could protect the forests, but de facto alternative institutions and lack of effective 
monitoring and implementations forbade them to be effective.
19 At the level of economic 
agents, deforestation is caused by the desire to convert land for agriculture and/or for the 
extraction of the valuable logs (Bromley, 1999). In this section we analyse how the most 
important incentives interact with the institutional framework determining the status quo. 
The process of deforestation is different in different sites according to differences in 
socio-economic and ecological conditions, and also local institutional settings are diverse 
in  the  case  study  area.  The  same  formal  institutions  produce  different  environmental 
outcomes and causes different social agreements to arise depending on local conditions. 
Under current conditions sustainable management of the forest is achieved only rarely. It 
is worth stressing that, as we will see, not only logging, but also those cases of effective 
forest protection operations contradict the formal regulatory framework. 
4.1 Incentives and institutions over the forests of Swat 
The  occurrence  of  deforestation  depends  on  local  physical  and  social  conditions. 
Incentives and institutions interact with geography because of  geography’s effects on 
transaction costs. Below we provide a classification of institutional regimes that are in 
place in Swat. 
At the bottom of the valley, in the most fertile area, land conversion for agriculture has 
historically been the main cause of deforestation. Over time forested areas have been 
cleared to make space for agricultural production and fruit orchards. Deforestation in the 
area, which is historically important, has lost significance. At the bottom of the valley 
land conversion is almost complete and there are no large stretches of standing forest left. 
Property rights in this part of the valley are well established, especially since easy access 
diminishes  enforcement  costs.  Historical  patterns  determined  land  ownership  to  be 
concentrated in the hands of the Khans families (see section 3.2 above).  
Agricultural activities at the bottom of the valley are the most valuable of the area and 
they are the most damaged by the ongoing deforestation taking place uphill. During our 
interviews several stakeholders noted microclimatic change (especially increases of hail 
precipitation) and problems from the watershed of the Swat River (floods and erosion) 
that  damage  agricultural  activities.  These  problems  were  linked  to  the  deforestation 
process.  
                                                 
19 In our study we do not investigate the issue of underlying and proximate causes of deforestation. For 
an in depth discussion see Bromley, 1999 and Contreras-Hermosilla, 2000.  
 
In the mid and upper valley, a lack of enforcement of property rights on forested areas 
determined a de facto open access situation in most of the forest. The state and the right 
holders – the former landowners
20 (mostly the Khans residing at the bottom of the valley) 
– are formally entitled to the ownership and to shares of revenues arising from forest 
cuttings,  but  lack  of  enforcement  allows  members  of  local  communities  and  timber 
smugglers to consider the forest as an open access resource and to exploit it accordingly. 
Formally,  the  forest  department  (representing  the  provincial  government)  and  the 
landowners (that reside at the bottom of the valley) have control over the forest. Under 
the formal management scheme a quota of wood is reserved for the local community for 
its needs, and the net revenues that accrue when there are cuttings are shared among the 
right holders (i.e. the former owners of the forest) and the forest department. The formal 
institutional setting, which remains unenforced, is not substituted by an alternative regime 
restricting access to the forest. 
The forest department and the forest development corporation, at times when markings 
and cuttings are allowed, collude with loggers and allow more wood to be extracted than 
the  amount  planned.  This  illegal  extraction  damages  right  holders  and  the  local 
community,  depriving  of  royalties  the  former,  of  self-consumption  opportunities  the 
latter, and of environmental services both.
21 
Illegal logging takes place also when there is no marking and organized logging: locals 
log more than they are allowed because their quota are insufficient, or because of the 
lengthy process involved in obtaining their share of the local quota, or they extract logs 
for commercial purposes (mostly in connection with the timber mafia, whose members 
are reported to be the hard-to-trace). When timber is logged and transported, chances of 
running  into  a  control  from  forest  officials  is  high  and  the  unauthorized  logging  is 
punished with a fine or a bribe.
22  
In summary, the area is characterised by a failure to organize forms of control by the 
state or by the local community. In the mid-valley, the local community is not involved in 
                                                 
20 The rightholders are the formal landowners, because with the accession of Sat to Pakistan the formal 
property of forests passed to the state and the former owner enjoyed the right to a share of the revenues 
from logs extraction. 
21 Sources of information on illegal operations are: cross-checked confidential interviews with people 
belonging to different stakeholders groups (i.e. forest department, law scholars, members of elders’ 
council), group discussions, and household surveys. 
22 The regulatory framework that should guide the operations of forest officials is so confused that 
different officials interpret their duties differently. As a result, often the difference between a fine and a 
bribe becomes fuzzy. For example, when interviewed, different forest officials answer differently on 
whether fines should be paid on the spot, or fines should be reported first, and then paid at the office of 
the range officer; also the amount of the fine to be levied varies markedly depending on the respondent 
and it is unclear what should be done with confiscated timber (reportedly some forest officers keep it in 
order to smuggle it, or for their own benefit). For a detailed exposition, see Steimann, 2004.   
 
monitoring and regulation of the exploitation activities. One of the factors contributing to 
this situation is the lack of trust and of social capital in the communities
23. Competing 
stakeholders exploit the forest in an unsustainable manner. Every agent would benefit 
from a collective management of the forest, but cannot reap the benefits of its restraint. 
Without a credible coordination mechanism and a fair property regime, they would not 
appropriate any value of the natural resource in any case. The dominant strategy is thus to 
harvest as much as possible resulting in a logging race typical of the so-called tragedy of 
the  commons  (Hardin,  1968).  Thus,  neither  the  management  practices  of  the  Forest 
Department,  nor  the  management  practices  of  the  local  community  point  towards 
sustainable extraction. The elimination of trees from the steep slopes causes soil erosion 
and slides. As a result, problems of land degradation are evident in the whole area.  
The only examples of sustainable forest management and effective enforcement of 
restraints of extraction activities are those that arose from spontaneous initiatives of local 
citizens, or centered on locals’ activities, but in cooperation with the forest department. 
Local groups of citizens at various times have been organizing themselves in order to 
defend some stretches of forest from exploitation. The most effective way that has been 
found  to  enforce  extraction  restrictions  was  with  limits  on  the  transport  of  logs: 
community-manned check posts have been set-up and timber loads have been blocked 
along the roads (Killeen and Khan, 2001; Khan et al., 2004). Other efforts to protect the 
forest involved local communities in concert with the forest department. The ones that 
were initiated under the donor-sponsored initiatives include community manned check 
posts, patrols from the local community guarding the forests, join patrols of community 
and forest department members and have been associated with improvements in forest 
cover (Steimann, 2004; Suleri, 2002). 
In  summary,  in  the  Swat  district,  the  inconsistency  between  different  regulatory 
frameworks create a situation of legal pluralism: there is a plethora of different rules that 
are  contending  the  governance  of  transactions.  Each  agent  turns  to  the  regulatory 
framework that is more convenient for her and neglect others’ claims (Meinzen-Dick and 
Pradhan, 2002). In most of the area rather than the official management regime, centred 
on the control of the forest department, a open access situation is in place. 
 
5.  STRATEGIES FOR INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
 
                                                 
23 During our meetings members of the community repeatedly asserted that they were not interested in 
the management of the forest, that they wanted these tasks to be supplied by the forest department and 
that all they want are shares of the revenues when marking and extraction takes place.  
 
Considering institutional arrangements as fixed and simply working from a ‘crime and 
punishment’ perspective (Becker, 1968) the most obvious solution to the enforcement 
problem would be to alter the cost-benefit outcomes for forest officials of entering into 
corruption deals, and of loggers harvesting illegally. When applied to corruption in the 
forest department, this would imply increasing the penalties for employees of the forest 
service caught for being involved in corruption and augmenting monitoring in order to 
identify more corruption cases. With respect to illegal loggers, this approach requires 
higher fines and increasing monitoring in the collection and transport of logs. 
The  successful  application  of  the  crime  and  punishment  approach  relies  on  the 
existence  of  enforcement  agencies  that  operate  efficiently  and  honestly. 
Recommendations based on this approach must take into account the institutional settings 
where  they  would  be  applied.  However,  in  Pakistan  the  highly  corrupted  police  and 
judiciary cannot patrol effectively the forest department. In turn the corrupt employees of 
the forest department cannot effectively monitor the behaviour of other agents.  
Furthermore, examples of sustainable management of the forest exist in the area, but 
they are not based on the state’s control of the forest, nor on better enforcement (or 
harsher  rule)  by  the  forest  department.  On  the contrary,  the  only  successful  cases  of 
sustainable management are based on collective action of local people and do not rely on 
the official enforcement agency (i.e. the forest department). In light of these findings, in 
this section we will outline the ongoing reform process, underlining its idiosyncrasies and 
setbacks.  Finally,  we  will  suggest  how  the  reform  process  could  take  a  new  spurt 
reinforcing collective action where it is already in place, and facilitating it where it is not 
happening.  
5.1 The ongoing reform process 
The unsustainability of de facto management practices and the environmental, social, and 
economic shortcomings of current deforestation rates in most of the North West Frontier 
Province are apparent and cause discontent voiced in numerous manners (e.g. the press 
often  laments  the  management  regime  and  its  effects).  The  social  and  environmental 
failures associated with the current management practices have motivated some reform 
attempts of the forestry sector. For the Swat district the most relevant reform effort was 
the  Forest  Sector  Strategy,  whose  incept  was  supported  by  a  loan  of  the  Asian 
Development Bank and by technical assistance to the program provided by the Dutch 
Royal Embassy.  
The main task of this donor-driven program was to move the management of the forest 
from  a  state  of  command  and  control  towards  co-management.  The  donors  hoped  to 
strengthen the local capabilities and to move the emphasis of the forest department from 
punishment towards partnership with local communities.  
 
The  program  was  not  successful.  Local  committees  were  established  in  several 
villages,  so  that  they  could  be  an  interlocutor  of  the  forest  department  and,  most 
importantly, contribute to the village land use plan.
24 However at the local level the most 
influential members of the community controlled the process as the committees over-
represent the wealthy. Moreover, the forest department has been unwilling to give up part 
of  its  powers  and  enter  in  a  real  partnership  with  the  locals.  Eventually,  due  to 
implementation slowness and especially because of the resistance at the provincial level 
to undertake the necessary steps to support the reform in due time, the support of donor 
agencies has been withdrawn in 2004. This was a mayor setback, especially in the few 
places  where  the  reform  started  to  yield  benefits.  Now,  trust  is  lost  in  this  type  of 
interventions (see Suleri, 2002). 
The Forest Ordinance of 2002 confirmed that the reform process was not proceeding 
smoothly.  The  inception  of  the  ordinance  was  admirable.  It  was  geared  towards  co-
management  and  partnership  in  a  stable  regulatory  framework.  However,  under  the 
insistence  of  more  conservative  powers  in  the  forest  department  and  the  provincial 
government, the final result was only a compromise. Even Sungi, a Pakistani grass root 
NGO working for the empowerment of the most marginal members of the society, which 
from the beginning was supportive of the reform process, eventually rejected the Forest 
Ordinance. Of special importance in determining Sungi’s stance were the punitive powers 
that the ordinance gave to the forest department and that could be used against local 
communities. 
Since the donors’ support to the reform process was stopped, the whole process halted 
and is reversed. The latest initiatives strengthen the forest department control of the forest 
and, in accordance to the 2002 Forest Ordinance, the Forest Force has been instituted.
25 
Now a 500 men-strong armed force will patrol the forest of the North West Frontier 
Province, including Swat. The forest department itself estimates that at least 3000 would 
be required in order to patrol effectively the forest of the province.
26 The insufficient 
number of men involved in the force will be the likely excuse for another failure of the 
‘crime and punishment’ approach applied to illegal logging. 
It is also worth noting that if the existing force would be effective much less than 500 
armed men would be necessary in order to control extraction activities in the area. Few 
roads run along the valley and functioning check-posts should be sufficient to stop a large 
part of the smuggling. Nevertheless, the guards manning the check posts are colluding 
with the smugglers, and arming the very same guards will not change their incentive 
                                                 
24  The  committees  are  the  Village  Development  Committee  (composed  by  men)  and  the  Women 
Organization (composed by women).  
25 See http://www.ttjonline.com/story.asp?sc=35057.  
26 The expected cost of equipping such a force would be of 60m Pakistani Rupees (or around 825,000 
euros). See http://www.dawn.com/2004/06/16/local23.htm  
 
structure.  Similarly,  armed  guards  patrolling  the  forest,  even  more  removed  from 
detection  possibilities,  will  easily  become  involved  in  illegal  deals.  Arming  forest 
officials may not yield any environmental, economic or social dividends. 
5.2 Institutional reforms 
The  other  mainstream  approach  to  reform,  the  “holistic  approach”,  is  a  countrywide 
program  of  institutional  change.  For  example,  Transparency  International  asks  for  a 
holistic  approach  based  on  national  integrity  systems  (see  Rosenbaum,  2005  for  an 
application  to  the  forestry  sector).  Its  implementation  remains  blocked  because  of 
opposing  powerful  interests.  In  the  case  of  Pakistan,  completing  the  checklist  of  the 
national  integrity  system  (including  independent  judiciary,  free  press,  establishing  an 
effective  watchdog  authority,  etc.),  would  imply  altering  deeply  the  institutional 
framework  of  the  country  (e.g.  Yusuf,  2002).  While  the  objective  of  decreasing 
corruption occurrence in the whole of Pakistan remains valid, the ecological and social 
problems caused by deforestation require viable initiatives to be adopted at a quick pace 
in the forestry sector.
27 Moreover, obtaining improvements and reducing corruption in 
some spearhead sectors – such as the forestry – can help to create a momentum for wider 
initiatives against corruption.
28 
Since, as discussed above, corruption is widespread in Pakistan, the officials from the 
forest  department  operates  within  a  system  where  effective  collaboration  of 
complementary enforcement agencies is infeasible. Therefore, institutional change should 
focus on a management regime that can be implemented mostly within the forestry sector.  
The forestry sector, as it stands now, is characterised by pervasive powers given to 
state’s agents and chronic corruption. Since, as delineated above, corruption is endemic to 
the  Pakistani  public  sector,  institutional  reform  should  reduce  state’s  involvement  in 
planning,  management,  and  enforcement  of  forest  policies.  As  mentioned  above, 
institutional arrangements that rely on local communities can halt deforestation.  
Where property rights are well established the reform process should be very careful 
with altering the existing situation as it could lead to open access conditions. Where 
private property is undisputed a system of market-based incentives would be supportive 
for the internalization of the positive externalities arising from the forest. As we explained 
                                                 
27 For an analysis of  how social action coalitions can produce and sustain anti corruption efforts see 
Johnston and Kpundeh, 2005. 
28  The  National  Integrity  System  (NIS)  has  also  been  applied  specifically  to  the  forest  sector 
(Rosenbaum, 2005), but its application in Pakistan seems doubtful. Some of the most important tools of 
NIS involve the partnership of commercial forest interests and the public sector (e.g. forest integrity 
pacts  and  business  principles  for  the  forest  sector).  In  Pakistan  commercial  logging  is  formally 
inexistent  (because  of  the  ban),  therefore  there  is  no  legal  basis  for  a  partnership  between  the 
commercial sector and the state.  
 
above, at the bottom of the valley, the avoidance of deforestation is not an issue as those 
areas have been already entirely cleared from the forest. 
Where communal efforts to protect the forest are in place – and deforestation is not 
occurring – a strengthening of the current institutional settings should take place, aligning 
the de jure to the existing situation. In this way the long-term management perspective of 
communities can be improved through stability.  
Where  institutions  are  not  well  defined  the  task  of  reform  is  more  difficult.  The 
impediments  to  the  self-organization  of  the  collective  must  be  removed  and  social 
learning  must  take  place,  which  can  be  a  lengthy  process.  The  broader  institutional 
environment,  especially  the  forest  department,  should  operate  as  a  facilitator  in  the 
process (Ostrom et al., 1999).  
At the same time, it is important to recognize that local communities can also fail to 
manage  in  an  equitable  and  sustainable  manner  the  natural  resource.  Differentiation 
within communities, because of wealth, power and/or of ethnicity, can mean that the most 
influential  members  of  the  community  can  hijack  the  devolution  process  and  the 
collective action process, turning it into their favour (Suleri, 2002; Rola and Coxhead, 
2005).  Social  trust  and  self-organization  capability  are  required  and,  if  they  are  not 
present, time and good examples will be required to build them. Hence, special attention 
should be devoted to monitoring and implementation. 
Summing up, when it is needed to think about institutional change for the management 
of the forest, to overcome failures of a present system, it is important to accommodate 
local ecological conditions and social capabilities. Thus, institutional set ups cannot be 
uniform,  but  need  built-in  flexibility  and  accurate  monitoring  of  achievements  and 
failures.  
5.3 Paths of change 
In  the  context  of  institutional  change,  a  particular  emphasis  should  be  given  to  the 
building of coalitions that can support change. After highlighting the needed steps for 
change, in this section we outline possible patterns to achieve change, through an analysis 
of the incentives of the most important stakeholders. Finally, we will outline some of the 
auxiliary reforms and federal level initiatives that could facilitate the reform process and 
the achievement of the final objective of sustainable forest management. 
 
5.3.1   Actors and incentives 
The  main  actors  with  stakes  in  the  forestry  sector  are  the  federal  and  provincial 
governments,  the  forest  department,  the  forest  development  corporation,  local 
communities (differentiated among themselves mostly because of right-holding issues),  
 
NGOs, and international donors. All these actors have some qualified interest in forest 
conservation. Additionally, there are the interests of those involved in illegal logging, the 
smugglers, the wood processing industry, and the economic agents involved in economic 
activities induced by timber trade. Thanks to corruption, they are able to influence some 
of the other actors as well.  
If change is offered as a package the main losers could get a compensation for their 
losses. This compensation would ease opposition and the actual change would be more 
likely to happen. We identify as the main losers from the achievement of sustainable 
management the local notables who are right-holders and would loose part of their rights 
if management would be moved to the local community. Another potential loser is the 
forest  department  which  would  suffer  in  terms  of  power,  routines  and,  for  certain 
officials, relevant shares of their income (now provided by kickbacks). Last, we will look 
at those directly involved in the illegal timber trade. 
Federal  and  Provincial  Government  have  important  stakes  in  forestry.  The  federal 
government is ultimately in the position to decide the overall legal framework and it 
should be in the position to allow for the internalization of positive externalities created 
by the forest. The provincial government can also influence the legal framework (within 
the  boundaries  set  by  the  federal  government)  and  is  the  recipient  of  a  share  of  the 
royalties produced when legal logging takes place. The situation is further complicated 
because there are discrepancies between the government’s mandate and the interest of 
agents acting in the name of the government. From the perspective of the government as a 
whole,  the  conservation  of  forest  resources  would  have  the  advantage  of  increasing 
welfare levels, ease the pressure on the issue exercised by mass medias and political 
discontent, and attract donors. Nevertheless, from confidential interviews with high-rank 
members of the forest department and of NGOs, it was revealed that important figures in 
the government (mostly at the provincial level) have stakes in illegal logging.  
Forest  department  and  the  forest  development  corporation  have  as  stated  main 
objectives the management and protection of the forest cover, and sustainable extraction 
and  fair  repartition  of  royalties.  Apart  from  their  official missions  it  is  apparent  that 
employees of these organizations have developed routines that are not oriented towards 
conservation  of  the  forest,  but  towards  appropriation  of  shares  of  revenues  that  are 
derived from illegal logging. Increasing the meagre salaries — as a substitute of actual 
kickbacks — and training of the lower ranks of the forest department are preconditions 
for  having  the  forest  department  and  the  forest  development  corporation  playing  a 
positive role in the forestry sector. Moreover, the forest department as a whole should be 
more involved in the reform process.
29 
                                                 
29 At least the forest guards should be aware of it, on the contrary of what happened with previous 
efforts (as we have seen above). Going a step further, and actually involving the forest department in  
 
Formal arrangements give landowners rights to part of the royalties from the net sale 
proceeds from log extraction operations. De facto, they obtain only a marginal share of 
what  they  are  entitled  to.  Still,  a  move  of  the  institutional  framework  towards 
co-management  would  further  limit  their  ability  to  appropriate  royalties  from  logs 
extraction. If the opposition of such influential members of the community would stop the 
reform process, as it seems likely, a scheme for compensation should be crafted. For 
example, incentives for the conservation and the re-afforestation in the lower part of the 
valley (where, as mentioned above, private property rights are well established) could 
also be included as a compensation for these losses. The fact that landowners are not 
getting much from their formal rights and the fact that their agricultural operations would 
benefit of local positive externalities from increased forest cover, should contribute to 
their acceptance of reform.  
NGOs are willing to and should be partners in the whole reform process. Because of 
their interest in forest resources’ conservation and the information and experience that 
they have available, they are valuable partners of any reform process. For many NGOs, 
this type of activity is functional to the achievements of their goals and their involvement 
can increase transparency and checks on the implementation of reform programmes.
30 
International donors have already shown their interest and willingness to assist and 
facilitate the reform process in the forestry sector in Pakistan. Unfortunately, the lack of 
success in previous reform efforts may undermine future engagement. Still, international 
donors are active in Pakistan and projects involving the management of natural resources 
offer them the opportunity of ripping benefits with respect to environmental and poverty 
reduction objectives. Furthermore, donors’ could exploit their experience of regulatory 
and  implementation  obstacles  to  reform  that  they  met  in  the  past.  They  could,  for 
example, make  their  support  conditional  on  ex-ante  legal  reforms  and  focus  on  their 
implementation (see also Suleri, 2002). The additional funds that derive from donors’ 
involvement  could  be  used  for  the  activities  to  reduce  resistance  to  reform  and  to 
guarantee equitable outcomes. 
If  the  management  regime  were  successfully  reformed,  members  of  the  local 
community that, to a different degree, are involved in illegal logging will suffer a setback 
in  their  economic  opportunities.  Very  often  these  members  of  the  community  are 
disadvantaged  and  in  dire  economic  conditions,  hence  the  reform  package  should  be 
complemented with measures supportive of alternative forms of sustainable livelihoods 
(see  below).  In  other  words,  the  intervention  towards  the  protection  of  the  natural 
resource should contain a social package to prevent its social outcome to be regressive. It 
                                                                                                                                            
the reform process would give to its members a sense of ownership and the necessary information to 
increase compliance. 
30 Such NGOs are, for example, IUCN, Sungi, or the WWF.  
 
can  be  argued  that  the  previous  interventions  to  reform  the  forestry  sector  were 
incomplete from this point of view. 
The “Timber mafia” bases its operations on the high rents that can be captured because 
of the high profitability of illegal trading in wood. A strategy for reducing the potential 
rents from illegal extraction would be to liberalise timber trade (see below), i.e. reducing 
tariffs and red tape for imported wood, undercutting substantially the size of rents to be 
appropriated via illegal logging. Consequently, the level of resources available locally to 
facilitate illegal logging will be reduced. 
 
5.3.2 Auxiliary initiatives and federal level reforms 
Finally, there are some initiatives that would facilitate the achievement of environmental 
and  social  targets,  and  some  reforms  that  are  necessary  conditions  for  instituting 
sustainable  management  practices  for  the  forest.  In  this  sub-section  we  provide  an 
overview of the most important interventions that would facilitate the achievement of 
sustainable  logging,  but  many  other  interventions  related  to  institutional  quality  and 
environmental  management  in  general  could  be  mentioned  (e.g.  reforms  to  improve 
governance  such  as  the  ones  proposed  by  Transparency  International,  population 
planning, land reform, etc). 
A key reform and a test for the will of the federal government for protecting the 
Pakistani forest is the abolition of all trade barriers on imported wood.
31 The domestic 
demand for wood cannot be met by the modest forest stands as it was recognised already 
in the Forestry Sector Master Plan (Government of Pakistan, 1992). Allowing imports 
would simply be the logical consequence of government’s efforts to protect the forest. 
Interventions  oriented  towards  the  provision  of  sustainable  livelihoods  of  local 
communities should focus both on those who use wood for self-consumption and those 
who extract it for commercial purposes. For the locals involved in logging, alternative 
social programs providing alternative sources of income should be set up. For all the 
households, their timber use could be reduced with the use of more efficient stoves and 
similar technical solutions (e.g. promoting the construction of micro-hydels).
32  
Payments for environmental services can be another way of financing the conservation 
of forests. Since Swat’s forests provide economic benefits (e.g. watershed protection of 
                                                 
31 Opening the Pakistani borders to timber trade  would  imply increasing pressure on international 
markets and, possibly, also increasing illegally harvested timber in neighbouring countries. While we 
recognise  issues  related  to  unsustainable  and  illegal  logging  in  world  markets,  reforms  and 
interventions at the global level (which we strongly support) are beyond the scope of this study. 
32 Pakistani and International NGOs operating in Pakistan have experiences with such programs and 
could be instrumental in implementing them within the forestry sector reform (e.g. see World Health 
Organization, 2005).  
 
agricultural activities and hydropower generation), a quantification of the major benefits 
could  lead  to  the  implementation  of  a  scheme  where  members  of  upstream  local 
communities are paid in order to preserve the forest. In economic terms, the positive 
externality will be internalised (for an overview see Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002). 
Some room could be available for the crime and punishment approach, when the state 
agencies in charge of enforcement are reliable and they are not likely to get involved in 
corruption.  The  one  body  of  Pakistan’s  security  forces  that  has  been  praised  for  its 
honesty  is  the  motorway  police  (Transparency  International,  2003).  This  force  could 
enforce restrictions on the movement of logs on the main roads of Pakistan. Even though 
the motorway police can be considered a reliable enforcement agency, it is worth noticing 
that the courts that would judge complaints arising from the operations of this force do 
not share such a remarkable score on corruption. 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
Our  analysis  shows  that  corruption  is  contributing  to  the  failure  of  the  management 
regime  of  Pakistani  forest  and  highlights  the  shortcomings  of  the  standard  reform 
approaches to corruption. The most invoked reform options with respect to corruption are 
the  ‘crime  and  punishment  approach’  and  the  ‘holistic  approach’.  The  ‘crime  and 
punishment’ approach requires sound enforcement institutions, which are not available in 
Pakistan. In our study, we saw that the insistence of Pakistani legislators on the former 
approach is at the root of present failures. Furthermore, the sweeping reforms required to 
introduce transparency in the Pakistan administration, the ‘holistic approach’, are at odds 
with  embedded  routines  and  vested  interests.  These  comprehensive  reforms  remain  a 
valuable social objective, but cannot provide timely solutions for the issues analyzed here. 
Corruption  problems,  when  the  overall  institutional  environment  is  weak,  are  best 
addressed by local institutional change. In a sector and in a region that are marked by low 
administrative  capabilities  to  enforce  state  regulations,  reforms  should  be  aiming  at 
reducing the coercive role of state agencies. Therefore, options where responsibilities in 
forest management are (at least partially) devolved to local communities should be at the 
centre stage of reform efforts. 
In contrast with what suggested here, the latest developments in the management of 
forest in Pakistan are increasing the enforcement effort and powers of state agencies. We 
find that the emphasis on state enforcement agencies is misplaced and is reproducing the 
conditions of present failures. A carefully crafted reform program should  include the 
strengthening of property rights, provisions for communal management and market based 
incentives,  depending  on  the  social,  economic,  and  ecological  characteristics  of  the 
different areas under consideration. These objectives should be endorsed by coalitions of  
 
actors empowered as to be able to enforce these propositions. State agencies should act as 
facilitators of the process rather than attempt to exert complete control over the forest.  
Ultimately, the relevant question is whether it is possible to save the remaining forest 
of Swat through reforms in the forest sector. The arguments presented in this article 
provide  support  for  the  existence  of  viable  alternatives  to  unsustainable  logging,  but 
significant changes in the way the problem is dealt with by Pakistani authorities have to 
take place in order to achieve them. 
 
APPENDIX: SOURCES OF INFORMATION IN THE STUDY 
This study is a part of the Poverty Reduction and Environmental Management (PREM) 
research  program  (http://www.prem-online.org/).  During  our  study  we  collected 
information from secondary sources, from individual interviews, from group discussions 
and  from  a  household  survey,  we  held  during  the  fieldwork.  The  interviewees  were 
informed  agents:  forest  officials,  a  conservator,  international  donors,  national  and 
international NGOs, lawyers, students of history, councils of the elders, and landowners. 
Interviews were in some cases individual and in some other in the form of focused group 
discussions. Further information was collected from 400 household surveys in the Swat 
district and from meetings in villages. Households’ information on economic and social 
conditions, and income dependence on natural resources. Village socio-economic profiles 
were drawn after the visits. The fieldwork took place between January and August 2005. 
A summary of the findings and the methodology applied in the project is available in Rafi 
Khan et al., 2006 and an outline of the conceptual framework used in the analysis is 
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